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NEIL A. ENGLEHART

A Tale of Two Afghanistans
Comparative Governance and Insurgency
in the North and South
A B S T R AC T

Afghanistan is often depicted as a failing state, but its failures display distinctive patterns over time and space. Regional variations in governance have been important
in shaping the ways the Afghan state has failed and the consequences of these failures. This article argues that a history of better governance in the north facilitated the
disarmament of militia warlords and comparative stability. By contrast, the south has
a long history of minimal formal governance, creating opportunities for increased
Taliban insurgency.
K E Y W O R D S : Afghanistan, Northern Alliance, Taliban, warlords, militias

INTRODUCTION

In the Western press, Afghanistan remains a land of warlords, insurgency,
weak governance, corruption, and violence. Many elements of this description are accurate, but it oversimplifies the situation in Afghanistan by underplaying significant regional variations and important changes over time. In
the current atmosphere of despair about the revival of the Taliban in the
south, the Hamid Karzai government’s most remarkable political achievement in northern Afghanistan—the disbanding of the largest Northern Alliance militias, once seen as the primary threat to the country’s stability—has
passed with little notice in the press and in policy circles. This difference
between improving central government control of the north and worsening
insurgency in the south is linked to contrasting historical patterns of governance in Afghanistan. This difference has significant implications for current
Neil A. Englehart is Associate Professor of Political Science at Bowling Green State University
in Bowling Green, Ohio, U.S.A. He wishes to thank Melissa K. Miller and the journal’s anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments. Email: <neile@bgsu.edu>.
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U.S. policy, which takes the relatively quiet north for granted to focus resources on the more troubled south.
For most of the 20th century, the Afghan central government ruled the
northern parts of the country more formally than the south, which was governed through patronage and Pashtun tribal politics. This pattern was reinforced during the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. A
handful of relatively stable quasi-states were built by major commanders in
the north, but tribal politics and Pakistani interests prevented the development of similar zones of stability in the south. As a consequence, there is a
legacy of more-extensive state capacity in northern Afghanistan. In the
north, it was easier for the central government to assert control over the existing administration, whereas the administrative vacuum in the south created opportunities for insurgents to erect parallel structures of governance.1
This article argues that the contrasting political dynamics in the north and
south shape the government’s capacity (and therefore its ability) to deal with
the insurgency, and examines the policy implications of these contrasting
dynamics for the U.S.-led coalition and the Karzai government.
T H E FA L L , R I S E , A N D FA L L O F T H E N O R T H E R N A L L I A N C E WA R L O R D S

The Northern Alliance warlords were veterans of Afghanistan’s long civil war.2
Many began their careers in the late 1970s as mujahidin leaders fighting the
PDPA government and the Soviets, or as government militia commanders.3
The most important of them developed large, relatively secure base areas that
they ruled as de facto mini-states during the Afghan civil war. These oases of
1. It must be noted that this does not necessarily mean that the north is completely immune to
insurgency; insurgents have recently begun to make inroads there. It does, however, mean that the
north is a more promising place to fight the insurgency than the south.
2. The Afghan civil war followed coups in 1973 and 1978, which removed the absolutist Afghan
monarchy and replaced it with the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
The PDPA introduced a radical rural reform program in 1978 that triggered massive resistance. At
the request of the PDPA, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in 1979 in an attempt to put down the
uprising, which instead only grew. When they withdrew in defeat in 1989, a purely Afghan civil war
broke out as the resistance factions battled each other for control of the country. This permitted the
PDPA successor government of Najibullah to survive until 1992. A degree of order was restored to
most of the country under the Taliban government after 1996, but Afghanistan has experienced
unending civil conflict for over 30 years.
3. Mujahidin refers to those who fought in the jihad (holy war) against the Soviet Union. Most
joined one of the seven political parties based in Pakistan that funneled U.S. and Saudi aid to the
fighters, although commanders on the ground generally operated with relative autonomy.
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relative peace and security were ringed with zones of conflict, where numerous
militias sparred for control in a civil war marked by a bewildering proliferation
of local conflicts and temporary alliances that changed over time. The Northern Alliance originated as a motley coalition united by the threat posed by the
Taliban.4 By 1998, the Taliban had ejected most of the Northern Alliance from
Afghanistan.5 The only major exceptions were Ahmed Shah Massoud, who
clung to a small corner of the northeast, and the Shiite parties Hizb-i Wahdat
and Harakat-i Islami in the mountainous Hazarajat region.
The U.S. war against the Taliban revived the Northern Alliance in 2001.
The U.S. fought a proxy war by deploying only minimal manpower, while
arming the Taliban’s enemies to provide the bulk of the fighters.6 As a result,
the Northern Alliance warlords rapidly rebuilt their fighting forces with U.S.
aid. After the collapse of Taliban resistance in November 2001, Northern Alliance commanders gained operational control over most of Afghanistan.
They rapidly resumed authority over their former fiefdoms, thus posing potential challenges to any incoming central administration in Kabul. In fact,
the commanders not only constituted whatever governance initially existed
on the ground but also dominated Karzai’s transitional government. At the
same time, they withheld desperately needed tax revenue from the central
government, engaged in internecine fighting, and committed human rights
abuses, thus discrediting Karzai’s government and threatening the transition
process.7 The most significant Northern Alliance militias at this time were
4. The Northern Alliance consists of five major parties: Harakat-i Islami Afghanistan (Islamic
Movement of Afghanistan), Hizb-i Wahdat Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan), Ittihad-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Union of Afghanistan), Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Party), and
Junbesh-i Melli-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan). Most of these parties
had little operational control over their ground commanders, and the Northern Alliance itself was
an umbrella group with little control over its member parties.
5. The Taliban arose in Kandahar in 1992 as a reaction against the violence and indiscipline of
the local mujahidin factions, which were embroiled in civil war. With Pakistani assistance, they
rapidly conquered most of the country and became the de facto government between 1996 and
2001. As their power grew, they became notorious for their repressive policies including restrictions
on the dress, movement, and employment of women, and the abuse of minorities. They were toppled by the U.S. following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, after they refused to extradite Osama bin Laden.
6. By one count, the total commitment of U.S. troops in Operation Enduring Freedom was 316
Special Forces soldiers and 110 CIA agents. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2002), p. 314.
7. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Afghanistan: The Return of the Warlords (New York: HRW,
2002); idem, “All Our Hopes Are Crushed”: Violence and Repression in Western Afghanistan (New York:
HRW, 2002); Mark Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban
Afghanistan (Bonn: Bonn Center for Conversion, 2002); Amnesty International, Afghanistan:
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those of Ismail Khan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and the Panjsheri forces commanded by Ahmed Shah Massoud until his death and by Mohammed Fahim
thereafter.
Ismail Khan

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Mohammed Ismail
Khan created a relatively stable, prosperous zone centered in the western city
of Herat, near the Iranian border. An officer in the Afghan army under the
Communists, he participated in the Herat Garrison’s mutiny against the
PDPA government in 1979 and subsequently became the most successful
mujahidin commander in the region. Although affiliated with the Pakistanbased party Jamiat-i Islami, in practice he enjoyed substantial autonomy.8
After capturing Herat in 1992, Ismail Khan disarmed smaller militias in
the area. Unlike most mujahidin leaders, he directly conscripted soldiers for
his core fighting force, relying only secondarily on semi-autonomous commanders for this purpose.9 This allowed his government to rise above the
petty rivalries of local politics and permitted the creation of a larger regional
organization. At his peak, Ismail Khan controlled Herat Province and also
much of neighboring Farah, Baghdis, and Nimroz Provinces.
Improved security following the disarmament of smaller militias led to an
economic boom in Herat, which was also fed by robust trade with neighboring Iran. Ismail Khan taxed this commerce, using the revenues to fund the
administrative system he inherited from the Communists. This provided
policing, a judiciary, and other services and infrastructure such as roads,
sanitation, clinics, and education. Improved security also allowed the U.N.
to begin landmine removal operations in Ismail Khan’s area of control, and
a number of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) launched
various humanitarian programs.10
Re-establishing the Rule of Law (London, 2003); Scott Baldauf, “Afghans Yet to Lay Down Arms,”
Christian Science Monitor, October 14, 2003; Gordon Peake, “From Warlords to Peacelords?” Journal
of International Affairs 30:2 (Spring 2003), pp. 181–91.
8. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1986), p. 108; Antonio Giustozzi, Genesis of a ‘Prince’: The Rise of Ismail Khan in Western Afghanistan,
1979–1992 (London: London School of Economics, Crisis States Working Paper, 2006).
9. After the fall of the government in 1992, he peacefully assimilated local government forces as
well. Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 276.
10. Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp.
141–42.
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Ismail Khan was, however, constantly embroiled in conflicts with neighboring rivals, including Abdul Rashid Dostum, who cooperated with the
Taliban in their attack on Herat in 1995 but later joined the Northern Alliance. Thus, Ismail Khan was forced to abandon the city in 1995, returning in
2001 as an ally of the U.S. against the Taliban.11
Subsequently, Ismail Khan came under increased international scrutiny
after being criticized by human rights organizations for his alleged repression
of political opponents, civil society groups, and women. In fact, his repressive behavior in 2001 was consistent with that between 1989 and 1995,12 but
an increased international presence in post-Taliban Afghanistan placed him
under greater scrutiny.
The Karzai government and its international donors were especially concerned about Ismail Khan’s control of customs revenue, which the Ministry
of Finance put at about $55 million a year.13 Despite pressure from the central
government and international donors, Ismail Khan remitted only token
amounts to the central government in 2002 and 2003.14 In the 1990s, when
there had been no central government, retaining these funds in Herat had
attracted little international attention and enabled Ismail Khan to make the
city an oasis of relatively good governance. After 2001, however, with the
Karzai government overwhelmingly dependent on foreign donors, Khan’s
behavior highlighted the central government’s weakness and inability to control its Northern Alliance partners.
The Karzai government, therefore, began to cautiously trim Ismail Khan’s
power. For example, the central government forced him to agree to share
11. Ahmed Rashid suggests that Pakistani smuggling syndicates, irritated with the heavy tolls
Ismail Khan exacted for traffic to Iran and Turkmenistan, had a hand in his fall. Taliban: The Story
of the Afghan Warlords (London: Pan Books, 2001), p. 39.
12. For a comparison, see HRW, All Our Hopes; and Gerald Bourke, “A Desert City That Has
Become an Afghan Minefield,” The Guardian (London), December 5, 1992.
13. Ilene R. Prusher, Scott Baldauf, and Edward Girardet, “Afghan Power Brokers,” Christian
Science Monitor, June 10, 2002; and Gulshan Dietl, “War, Peace, and the Warlords: The Case of Ismail Khan of Herat in Afghanistan,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 3:2 & 3
(Summer & Fall), pp. 141–66.
14. Associated Press (AP), “Afghanistan’s Weak Government Gets Boost,” July 25, 2002; Ellen
Knickmeyer, “Afghan Army Deploys to Calm Bloody Factional Fighting,” ibid., March 23, 2004. In
2002–03, foreign aid comprised over 80% of the budget. Michael Carnahan, Nick Manning, Richard Bontjer, and Stéphane Guimbert, eds., Reforming Fiscal and Economic Management in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), p. 14. In 2008 it was still budgeted to cover 39% of
government spending. See Islamic Government of Afghanistan, 1386 National Budget (Kabul: Ministry of Finance, 2008).
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Herat’s customs revenue in July 2002.15 The initial amounts were small, but
grew over time as the government undermined Ismail Khan in other ways.
In December 2002, Karzai issued a decree barring any individual from simultaneously holding political and military appointments.16 This decree
threatened the warlords, who had relied on the fusion of military and political power to retain dominance in their respective fiefdoms. Ismail Khan
chose to step down as commander of government troops in Herat, which
were actually his own militiamen in official government uniforms. One of
his lieutenants was placed in command, Ismail Khan remained governor, and
little really seemed to have changed.
Ismail Khan’s position was weakened further by the arrival of a U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Herat in December 2003. PRTs were
empowered with dual security and reconstruction missions but, in this instance, the arrival of the PRT also denoted increased attention to Herat by
the central government and international forces. By itself, this did not undermine his control of the province; for example, in the 2003 constitutional
assembly elections, Ismail Khan still controlled an estimated 98% of the candidates returned from Herat.17 However, the PRT represented a resource the
central government could employ to curtail Ismail Khan’s power if future
opportunities presented themselves.
What fatally undermined Ismail Khan’s position was factional fighting,
which had always been endemic but took on a new significance with the
presence of U.S. forces. First, one of his commanders rebelled, and the consequent fighting led to the deployment of Afghan National Army (ANA)
troops with U.S. trainers.18 This was followed by renewed attacks from an old
rival, Amanullah Khan, who proved more formidable than in the past, forcing Ismail Khan to ask for additional government troops to reinforce his
militia.19 By September 2004, Ismail Khan’s circumstances had changed
15. AP, “Afghanistan’s Weak Government.”
16. Waheedullah Massoud, “Karzai Delivers First Body-Blow to Powerful Afghan Warlords,”
Agence France-Presse, December 16, 2002.
17. Herve Bar, “Mujahedin Candidates Dominate Afghan Loya Jirga Elections,” ibid., December
9, 2003.
18. Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Army Moves into Unruly Province Near Iran,” New York Times, April
1, 2004.
19. The sudden, mysterious improvement of Amanullah Khan’s forces led to rumors that he had
been supplied by either the U.S. or the Karzai government to attack Ismail Khan. Ismail Khan
himself has made claims to this effect. For example, see Victoria Burnett, “Unseated Afghan Governor Looks to the Future,” Boston Globe, September 23, 2004.

AS5004_05_Englehart.indd 740

8/19/10 5:31 PM

This content downloaded from 129.1.59.60 on Thu, 7 Aug 2014 08:39:19 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

E N G L E H A R T / T W O A F G H A N I S TA N S • 7 4 1

dramatically. He had been stripped of direct command over his militia,
forced to remit customs revenue to the central government, betrayed in a
rebellion, nearly bested by an old rival, and military forces representing the
U.S. and the central government had been introduced into his base of Herat.
In September 2004, the final blow fell when Karzai removed the weakened Ismail Khan from his position as governor of Herat. He was replaced
with an outsider who, at the time, was serving as Afghanistan’s ambassador
to Ukraine and was therefore dependent on Karzai for his position. Ismail
Khan’s removal triggered protests in Herat, including the burning of U.N.
and international NGO offices. ANA troops fired on the protestors, killing
several.20 Ismail Khan was, however, in no position to offer further resistance.
Karzai softened the blow by offering him a cabinet position as energy minister
in the central government. Thus, Ismail Khan was accommodated politically,
but away from his traditional base of regional power in Herat.
Abdul Rashid Dostum

Dostum was also a military officer under the Communists, commanding one
of the most effective pro-government militias. He turned against the Najibullah government in 1992, precipitating its collapse. Dostum then absorbed local mujahidin into his militia, creating the largest single military
force in the country. He subsequently used these forces to create a secure
zone encompassing the important cities of Balkh, Mazar-i-Sharif, and
Shiberghan.
Revenue from natural gas fields and taxation of the border trade with
the central Asian republics financed Dostum’s rule. After the rise of the
Taliban, Dostum was able to secure aid from Russia, Turkey, and the Central Asian republics by presenting himself as a buffer against radical Islam
and a protector of Turkic-speaking peoples against Pashtun domination.21
Like Ismail Khan, Dostum used these revenues to build a stable zone of
governance with relatively good services and infrastructure, preserving
much of the administration he inherited from the previous government.
Mazar, in particular, was a flourishing city with good roads, reliable electricity supplies, regularized garbage collection, and an institutionalized
educational system.
20. Agence France-Presse, “Three Injured in Protests after Afghan Warlords Dismissal,” September 11, 2004.
21. Rashid, Taliban, p. 56.
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Dostum was defeated by the Taliban in 1998, after one of his lieutenants
betrayed him.22 He then fled the country and returned only in 2001 with the
support of the U.S., at which time he quickly regained control over much of
his northern fiefdom. He was appointed to a series of official positions in the
Karzai government after 2001 but refused to relocate to Kabul. Dostum’s
return was not as smooth as that of Ismail Khan. While Dostum reoccupied
his base at Shiberghan, other factions contested his control of the larger and
economically more important city of Mazar. Dostum’s forces clashed repeatedly with those of fellow Northern Alliance commander Atta Mohammed.
The central government was unable to police these conflicts because its only
armed forces in the region were those of the combatants: Dostum’s forces
had been designated the 53rd Division (later 8th Corps) of the Afghan army,
while Atta Mohammed’s were the 7th Corps.
Dostum’s behavior after the 2001 invasion reinforced his image as the
Northern Alliance warlord with the worst human rights record. Notable
even among the Northern Alliance commanders for his brutality, Dostum
received a great deal of attention from the international community and
human rights NGOs.23 His forces had been notorious for massacring prisoners of war and for their abuses in Kabul during the civil war. They had also
allegedly executed and imprisoned many political opponents. In 2001–02,
his troops massacred hundreds of Taliban prisoners and engaged in retaliatory violence against Pashtun communities in the north.24 They also intimidated voters and candidates in both the constitutional assembly elections of 2002 and the 2003 presidential election, in which Dostum was a
candidate.25
In May 2003, a British PRT arrived in Mazar, creating a dynamic similar
to that faced by Ismail Khan in Herat. The PRT was not an overt threat to
22. Dostum had reportedly been responsible for killing the man’s brother and ordered the assassination of other family members. Ibid., p. 58.
23. See HRW, All Our Hopes; Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture; Ali Jalali, “Afghanistan in
2002: The Struggle to Win the Peace,” Asian Survey 43:1 (January 2003), pp. 174–85; and Human
Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC), Speaking Out: Afghan Opinions on Rights
and Responsibilities (Islamabad: HRRAC, 2003). Dostum actually retained the services of a Washington lobbying firm to improve his image in the U.S. and deal directly with the U.S. government.
Frederic J. Frommer, “Lobbyist Adds Afghan Warlord to List of Unusual Clients,” AP, December
14, 2001.
24. Carlotta Gall, “Suicide Bomb Attack Misses Regional Afghan Leader,” International Herald
Tribune, January 21, 2005.
25. HRW, Afghanistan: The Return of the Warlords.
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Dostum, but it did challenge his military supremacy and, unlike rival warlords, could not be intimidated. Shortly thereafter, Dostum was induced to
sign an agreement to remit customs revenues to Kabul and, in conformity
with Karzai’s December 2002 decree, he surrendered his political (but not
military) position. Atta Mohammed took the opposite route, cooperating
with the government and becoming governor of Balkh Province, which
includes Mazar, in 2004.
Dostum’s troops continued to operate in and around Mazar, sometimes
clashing with those of Atta Mohammed. The British used these clashes as an
opportunity to negotiate a disarmament deal between the two. Rather than
face possible military action from international forces, Dostum agreed to reduce his troops from about 20,000 to a few hundred by mid-2004 and to
canton his heavy weapons.26 Even so, in April of 2004, Dostum mobilized his
followers to attack the centrally appointed governor of Faryab Province, who
had induced one of his local commanders to switch sides. This resulted in a
contingent of ANA troops being sent to Faryab Province, providing a further
counterweight to Dostum’s authority.27 Dostum currently retains a small contingent of armed followers, and there are incessant rumors that he plans to
rebuild his forces using secretly cached weapons. For now, however, his power
has been substantially reduced, and his followers are more likely to try to
advance his interests through peaceful demonstrations than military force.28
Ahmed Shah Massoud

A third relatively stable zone of governance developed in the Panjsher Valley
north of Kabul. It was created by the Jamiat-i Islami’s main commander,
26. Both Dostum and Atta Mohammed cantoned their heavy weapons in warehouses controlled
by Afghan army corps staffed with their respective former fighters, suggesting that they could possibly
access the weapons when desired. International Crisis Group (ICG), Disarmament and Reintegration
in Afghanistan (Kabul/Brussels: ICG, 2003).
27. Antonio Giustozzi, “Good” State vs. “Bad” Warlords? A Critique of State-Building Strategies in
Afghanistan (London: London School of Economics, Crisis States Working Paper, 2004); Carlotta
Gall, “Already Stretched, Afghan Leaders Face New Threat,” New York Times, April 12, 2004.
28. The Economist, “It’s Rough up North,” September 2, 2006; Afghan Islamic Press, “Pro-Dostum Supporters Hold Rally in Northern Afghan Province,” BBC Monitoring, South Asia, May 29,
2007. Even with his reduced forces, Dostum has remained true to form. In February 2008, he and a
handful of followers attacked the home of one of his former commanders, Akbar Bai, beating him
and his sons in retaliation for accusations of human rights abuses. Dostum was eventually arrested
after a standoff with police. He subsequently left the country for Turkey, ostensibly for medical treatment. Fisnak Abrashi, “Karzai Pressured to Rein in Warlords,” Agence France-Presse, July 20, 2009.
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Ahmed Shah Massoud. Massoud was a Tajik raised in Kabul, and his political career began in a Muslim youth organization at Kabul University. He was
involved in an abortive uprising against the Daoud government in 1975 and
fled to Pakistan. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Massoud
returned to lead a mujahidin group. He had the advantage of operating in an
area with relatively weak tribal conflicts and working with a cadre of welleducated Tajik commanders.
Massoud became one of the most respected mujahidin commanders because of his success in holding off repeated Soviet offensives. He built what
Rubin calls “the most extensive protostate in Afghanistan.”29 Massoud’s territorial administration was divided into numerous districts and subdistricts,
each with committees for civil administration, economic development and
finance, judicial affairs, military and intelligence issues, and social services.30
His accomplishment was all the more impressive because of repeated and
intense Soviet assaults on the Panjsher Valley.
In the mid-1980s, Massoud began expanding his area of control but was
eventually driven out of much of the Panjsher Valley by a massive Soviet offensive in 1984. He shifted his base to the city of Taloqan in Takhar Province.
In 1985, he formed the Supervisory Council of the North (SCN), uniting
Jamiat commanders from neighboring areas. Massoud assumed the title of
amir (commander or leader) of the council, a symbolic elevation of status
that placed him above petty local politics and traditional forms of segmentation, “so that a khan (local leader) or alim (Islamic scholar) could pay
respect to him, a younger man from a middle-class family, without being
humiliated.”31 The SCN contained subcouncils of ulama (Islamic clergy),
commanders, and elders, and operated several functional committees, much
like ministries dealing with the military, finance, politics, education, culture,
and medicine.32
For all his organizational efforts, Massoud was not able to create a secure
base area in the Panjsher Valley analogous to those in Herat or Mazar. The
29. Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 234.
30. Roy, Islam and Revolution, p. 160; and Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 235. These
efforts were supported through a combination of local taxes and donations, and also by foreign
funds. Massoud received some funds through Jamiat-i Islami, and sometimes direct subsidies from
the CIA. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin, 2005).
31. Roy, Islam and Revolution, p. 221.
32. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 237; and Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, pp. 92–93.

AS5004_05_Englehart.indd 744

8/19/10 5:31 PM

This content downloaded from 129.1.59.60 on Thu, 7 Aug 2014 08:39:19 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

E N G L E H A R T / T W O A F G H A N I S TA N S • 7 4 5

strategic location of the valley led to repeated attacks by the Soviets, rival
militias, and later the Taliban. However, Massoud’s Panjsher Valley political
organization has persisted over time as one of the most stable political formations in the country. It dominated the Karzai government until the 2004
election, including the important ministries of defense, foreign affairs, education, justice, and reconstruction and refugees in Karzai’s transitional cabinet. Indeed, one factor contributing to the revival of the Taliban was the
perception among Pashtuns that Karzai’s government was dominated by
Panjsheri Tajiks.33 The Panjsheris were the largest force in the field against the
Taliban when the 2001 war began, and they quickly gained control of the
region around Kabul.
Assassinated by al-Qaeda agents on September 9, 2001, Massoud was succeeded by his security chief, Mohammed Fahim. Fahim’s forces received
massive U.S. aid after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and he was made minister of
defense in the Karzai government. However, this post and his location in
Kabul ultimately made Fahim vulnerable to international forces and the Karzai
government because his forces were concentrated in their center of power.
Fahim’s term as defense minister was fraught with tensions with Karzai
and the Americans. Widely perceived as a rival to Karzai, and initially arguably more powerful than the president himself, Fahim used the Ministry of
Defense to build a network of clients with semi-official militias under their
command.34 Such behavior brought him into conflict with the Americans,
who tried to pressure Karzai to remove him. Karzai, however, chose a characteristically indirect and non-confrontational way of dealing with Fahim,
avoiding outright provocations and instead maneuvering to remove him
without a showdown.
In 2003, Fahim was invited to run for vice-president on Karzai’s ticket.
Because candidates were required not to command non-state militias, Fahim
33. Collectively, the Northern Alliance groups controlled over half the ministries in the transitional government, as well as holding all three deputy president posts. This dominance moderated
markedly after the 2004 and 2005 elections, reflecting Karzai’s reduced reliance on the Northern
Alliance. The composition of Karzai’s new cabinet is still undecided at the time of writing (June
2010), but, with the rejection of Ismail Khan’s appointment by Parliament, it is possible that the
new cabinet will contain no Northern Alliance warlords.
34. For example, see Susan Glasser, “Rivalry Revived in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, July 24,
2002; Anasi Kulberg, “Warlords and Governors in Today’s Afghanistan,” Eurasian Politician, November 2002; Halima Kazem, “Brewing Power Struggle in Kabul,” Christian Science Monitor, October 12, 2003; and Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency
in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 16.
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ordered his forces disbanded. This, in itself, was not a major sacrifice because
many of his militia men had actually been integrated into the ANA, and he
remained minister of defense. He was, however, reluctant to give up that
post, also technically required by the election law. This rule was not evenly
enforced, and many candidates with both official appointments and militias
(including Dostum) were permitted to run. Nonetheless, Karzai eventually
used this as a pretext to drop Fahim from the ticket.35 When the Japanese
government threatened to withhold $41 million in aid pending reform in the
defense ministry, Karzai seized the opportunity to remove 20 senior Northern Alliance officials, thus weakening Fahim’s control of the ministry even
further. After the elections, Fahim was himself removed as defense minister.
Fahim has, nonetheless, maintained a high political profile as a member of
Parliament and even agreeing to run on Karzai’s ticket again in 2009; he is
currently vice-president of Afghanistan.36
Curbing the Northern Alliance Warlords

After the 2001 war, there was serious concern in the international community that the dominance of the Northern Alliance warlords would jeopardize
its intervention in Afghanistan and undermine its legitimacy. Warlord dominance could have made it appear that the international community had intervened only to again empower the very people who had devastated the
country after the Soviet withdrawal. Yet, by the end of 2004, the largest
warlord formations in Afghanistan had been sharply reduced in size or disbanded altogether (see Figure 1). This was accomplished formally through a
voluntary Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) campaign, which was perceived by the international community as being highly
successful.37 Its success, however, was largely because of adroit political maneuvering by Karzai.
The Karzai government did not eliminate all non-state armed groups in
2003 and 2004, but it did demobilize the forces of those leaders deemed to
35. Stephen Graham, “Karzai Announces Candidacy,” AP, July 26, 2004.
36. Agence France-Presse, “Afghanistan’s Karzai Defends Choice of Vice-President,” June 17,
2009.
37. Interview with David Wilson, director of Afghan New Beginnings Program, Disarmament
of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), Kabul, August 1, 2007. Altogether, 63,000 fighters were disarmed
under the DDR program, which ended in 2005. In July 2004, Karzai decreed all remaining nonstate armed groups illegal, and a DIAG program was launched as the successor to the DDR.
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figure 1. Armed Strength Major Northern Alliance Warlords, 2000–2008
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sources: By the author. Figure 1 draws on data from a much larger data collection project on nonstate armed groups being undertaken by the author and his students. It is based on 96 estimates drawn
from 93 separate sources including academic publications, news articles, NGO reports, international
agencies, and government sources. The mean estimate for each group for each year is presented in Figure 1.
The full list of sources is available upon request from the author.

be the most problematic for the central government. Dostum, Fahim, and
Ismail Khan (as seen in Figure 1) previously commanded forces numbering
in the tens of thousands and could have posed serious threats to the central
government if provoked. In contrast, the remaining militias are more numerous but smaller, and any of them could be dealt with individually by the
army and police forces.38
Significant problems currently remain in the north, including conflicts
over land, violations of civil and political rights, and the continued repression of women.39 The removal of the major warlords has also led to the reopening of many local feuds and created opportunities for insurgent recruitment.40 Yet, things could easily have been much worse than they are today.
38. There are officially estimated to be about 1,800 such groups. In private communication in
the summer of 2007, other researchers collating the data indicated to the author that the officially
stated figure was probably an undercount. Instead, they estimate the true figure to be as high as
4,600. The size cutoff for an illegal armed group is, however, set absurdly low at five fighters for
these researchers. As one anonymous U.N. official put it to the author, this means that “if you and
four of your friends in a village own rifles, you are an illegal armed group.”
39. Interviews with Kapalasingham Sritharan, human rights officer, United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Kabul, Afghanistan, July 31, 2007; Ahmed Zia Anghari, researcher, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), Kabul, Afghanistan, July 30,
2007. See also Liz Alden Wiley, Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
(Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2003).
40. Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban’s Marches: Herat, Farah, Baghdis, and Ghor,” in Antonio
Giustozzi, ed., Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009).
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For example, the removal of the warlords could have created serious armed
conflicts or dangerous political vacuums in their respective areas of dominance. For many locals, the major warlords (especially Ismail Khan and Dostum) represented the only security and stability they had known in over a
generation of continuous warfare, thus explaining their enduring influence in
their respective regions even after the dismantling of their militias.41 Yet, aside
from demonstrations against their removal, the north has been relatively stable.
Well-institutionalized administrations in urban Herat, Mazar, and Balkh have
functioned normally despite the change of leadership, although insurgents
have recently begun to make inroads in rural areas in the north.
Arguably, the overall legacy of warlord rule has been quite positive for
governance in the north. For example, local government has survived in the
base areas controlled by Ismail Khan and Dostum, delivering essential services and maintaining the infrastructure. Griffin refers to the region under
Dostum’s control as “the least reconstructed of all the remnants of the former
PDPA state apparatus.”42 This should be interpreted as praise given the poor
state of public administration in many parts of Afghanistan. A 2003 NGO
report on Herat commented that “the administrative structures of the state
have proven to be fairly resilient” and that “if the hierarchy and reporting
lines to Kabul were re-established, [local officials] would be competent leaders
on behalf of Kabul as much as they are currently on behalf of local governors
or power-brokers.”43 This conclusion is remarkable in a country that had suffered nearly 25 years of civil war, much of that time without a functional
central government.
T H E S O U T H A N D T H E TA L I B A N C H A L L E N G E

For both cultural and historical reasons, governance in southern Afghanistan
has been quite different than in the north. The monarchy and the Communist government did less institution-building there than in the north. In
41. This has been intensely frustrating for human rights groups, and Karzai’s opponents have
attempted to use it against him. For instance, see Griff Witte, “A Karzai Victory Is Just the Ticket
for Regional Commanders,” Washington Post, June 17, 2009; and Tim Coghlan, “Karzai Rivals
Promise to Turn Poll into ‘Referendum on the Warlords’,” Times (London), June 17, 2009.
42. Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London:
Pluto Press, 2001), p. 19.
43. Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Assessing Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Early Observations and Recommendations for Action (Kabul: AREU, 2003), p. 2.
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addition, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, no large and well-organized
quasi-states formed in the south as they did in the north. Numerous militias
battled among themselves, but none was able to exploit any significant concentrations of resources in order to build quasi-states with regularized revenue sources, bureaucratic administration, and public services. This was, in
part, because of the segmented nature of their organizations and also because
of unique historical patterns of governance in the south. As a result, it was
much more difficult for the Karzai government to govern the south, leaving
a vacuum of power that was successfully exploited by the Taliban.
In the north, warlord military formations were typically descended from
government forces (e.g., Dostum); mujahidin guerillas (e.g., the Panjsheris);
or a mixture of the two (e.g., Ismail Khan’s forces). In the south, however,
the strongmen’s forces tended to be based on tribal affiliations, especially
after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. All politics in the south—whether
within the Communist Party, among the mujahidin, or between the civil war
militias—remained inflected with tribal feuds and longstanding competition
between leading local families. The only force that proved capable of overcoming these rivalries was the Taliban, with their ideology of Islamic brotherhood and ample supply of Pakistani cash. The Taliban were able to build
larger political structures and assert their dominance over the rest of the
country, thus reproducing the political pattern of the monarchy, which had
also used foreign subsidies to expand from Kandahar and establish Pashtun
dominance over Afghanistan.
Historically, the so-called Pashtun belt had been governed through patronage of local leaders and tribal politics. In the 19th century, Durrani monarchs were able to use foreign subsidies, aid, and natural resource income to
fund patronage for local leaders, thus effectively buying off most political
opposition.44 Patronage was distributed through leading families, which promoted inequality and “feudalization” among sedentary Pashtuns but contributed little to institutionalizing governance.45 Neither the monarchs nor their
clients had an interest in building strong formal institutions. Instead, the
system of governance was one of particularized benefits and personal
44. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, ch. 2.
45. Jon Anderson, “There Are No Khans Anymore: Economic Development and Social Change
in Tribal Afghanistan,” Middle East Journal 32:2 (Spring 1978), pp. 167–83; Brent Glatzer, “Center
and Periphery in Afghanistan: New Identities in a Broken State,” Sociologus 52:1 (Winter 2002),
p. 118; Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, “Tribes” and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1990–2005
(London: London School of Economics, Crisis States Working Papers, 2005), p. 4.
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loyalties. As Anderson points out, the tribe remained central for the Pashtuns, whereas the state was peripheral.46
The Communist coup of 1978 disrupted this system of patronage. The PDPA
viewed the local leading families as being feudal elements and obstacles to political centralization. For this reason, it undertook a systematic campaign to
eliminate them in a “veritable slaughter of the tribal aristocracy.”47 The longterm lack of institutional development in the south under the monarchy was
subsequently exacerbated by these purges and by the war against the Soviets,
which militated against the preservation of those state institutions that did exist.
As opposed to the north, where quasi-states emerged and provided some
security in their core areas, tribes became increasingly important to individuals as sources of protection in the south.48 Yet, the Communist purge of
traditional local notables meant that tribal leadership changed in character.
In the absence of more traditional leadership, a “new generation of ‘rougher’
local leaders” rose to prominence with a greater emphasis on armed followers
rather than the patronage employed by the traditional leading families.49
Aspiring warlords and strongmen used kin ties to organize networks of fighters, but none was able to rise above the logic of social segmentation to build
larger structures.
In addition, Pakistani intervention in the war against the Soviets complicated the situation. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had a policy of
discouraging the development of royalist forces for fear that King Zahir Shah
would pursue friendly relations with India. Indeed, the ISI discouraged the
emergence of any significant leadership from the Durrani tribal confederation,
the traditional power base of the monarchy. The Pashtun-led parties in Peshawar, Pakistan, during the anti-Soviet jihad were headed by Ghilzais—the traditional rivals of the Durranis. This meant that the tribal confederation with
46. Jon Anderson, “Khan and Khel: Dialectics of Pakhtun Tribalism,” in Richard Tapper, ed.,
The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), p. 121.
47. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay and Alexandre Bennigsen, “Soviet Experience of Muslim
Guerilla Warfare and the War in Afghanistan,” in Yaacov Ro’i, ed., The USSR and the Muslim World
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 209. See also William Maley, “Political Legitimation in
Contemporary Afghanistan,” Asian Survey 27:6 (June 1987), p. 12; Roy, Islam and Resistance, pp.
96–97; Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 96–97.
48. Anna Simons describes a similar process of retreat into kin-based networks of protection in
another segmentary lineage society in Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone (Boulder: Westview,
1995).
49. Giustozzi and Ullah, “Tribes” and Warlords, pp. 5, 9.
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the most traditional legitimacy, the Durranis, was systematically put at a
competitive disadvantage by the distribution of foreign patronage to the
Ghilzais.
As they took control of the south, the Taliban improved security and
policing but did not attempt to build a more capable administration. Most
of their achievements were the product of suppressing rival militias—
achievements later erased during the U.S. invasion. As a result, the Karzai
government faced more-serious state-building challenges in the south than
in the north. Rather than assume control of a relatively intact local civil
service as it did in the north, the government had to build one from the
ground up in the south. Implicitly following the model of the monarchy,
Karzai appointed local notables to government positions and used patronage
to secure their loyalty. However, the notables who were available to the Karzai government were not the same as those historically employed by the
monarchy. With traditional leading families decimated and their influence
weakened by years of exile, most of the local leaders available to Karzai were
relatively recent militia-backed strongmen. Many of them lacked legitimacy
because they were notorious for their abusive behavior during the civil war.
Like the older generation of notables, these strongmen needed patronage
to reward their followers, leading to a proliferation of poorly qualified political appointees in the nascent administration. Giustozzi argues that the Karzai administration is currently even more patrimonial than those of the monarchy and the Taliban.50 Furthermore, the Karzai government’s strategy
involved picking winners in longstanding local feuds, thus making enemies
among their disgruntled rivals and potential recruits for the Taliban.51
The Taliban capitalized on the opportunities this dynamic presented, strategically eliminating the pockets of state capacity that existed by assassinating government officials and destroying infrastructure.52 Schools are especially important targets in this regard because they represent the only
government presence in many localities. The Taliban also attack international NGO workers and U.N. officials to hamper their activities.53 At the
50. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, p. 179.
51. Thomas Ruttig, The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency (Berlin: Afghan Analysts
Network, 2009).
52. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, p. 103.
53. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), “Attacks Deprive 300,000 Students of
Education,” September 22, 2008, <www.irinnews.org>; Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop,
p. 105; and IRIN, “Attacks on NGOs Rise Sharply in 2008,” April 15, 2008, <www.irinnews.org>.
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same time, the Taliban seek to demonstrate their ability to govern by setting
up parallel structures of administration. The Taliban’s authority varies across
localities according to their level of control, but whenever possible they set
up courts, alternative schools, and other services to demonstrate their capacity to deliver services where the government has failed to.54
Kandahar

The logic of the south can be illustrated through the case of Kandahar, the
region’s largest city and traditional seat of the Pashtun rulers of Afghanistan.
Kandahar has historically been an important trading center because of its
favorable location. Therefore, it had the resource potential to sustain a protostate similar to that which existed in Mazar and Herat. However, no such
oasis of peace and stability developed; instead factional infighting prevented
any one commander from taking control of the city. Kandahar suffered from
heavy fighting at the end of the Soviet occupation when, as the Soviets withdrew from the city in 1988, various factions began jockeying for control.55
Unlike Mazar or Herat, no government remained intact in Kandahar after
the Soviet withdrawal. A local council (shura) of factional commanders
was eventually formed, but it could not provide for effective security or
governance.
Much of the subsequent conflict in Kandahar broke down along tribal
lines. The Pakistani policy of favoring Ghilzai leadership among the mujahidin fragmented the Durranis, who predominate in Kandahar. Thus, among
the Durrani tribes “the main Barakzai leader [Abdul Latif, and later his son
Gul Agha Shirzai] was a member of NIFA (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan), the main Popolzai leader [Habibullah Karzai] was a member of ANLF
(Afghan National Liberation Front),” while the main Alokazai commander,
Mullah Naqibullah, was initially a member of the ANLF, but later switched
to Jamiat-i Islami.56 During the civil war, this led to a multi-sided battle for
control of the region, chiefly within the major Durrani alliance known as the
Zirak tribes, which include the Alokazai, Barakzai, and Popolzai. Numerous
54. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop.
55. Donatella Lorch, “Afghan Gridlock: Factions Vie for Ancient Crossroad and for Nation’s
Future,” New York Times, September 12, 1988; Anatol Lieven, “Mujahidin Fail to Subdue the Pirate
Turncoat,” Times (London), January 26, 1989; and John Kifner, “Kandahar Journal: New Problem
for Guerillas: No Russians to Fight,” New York Times, June 6, 1989.
56. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 92.
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smaller militias formed as well, causing widespread insecurity. In the words
of Rashid:
International agencies were fearful of even working in Kandahar as the city
itself was divided into warring groups. Their leaders sold off everything to
Pakistani traders to make money, stripping down telephone wires and poles,
cutting trees, selling off factories, machinery and even road rollers to scrap
merchants. The warlords seized homes and farms, threw out their occupants
and handed them over to their supporters. The commanders abused the population at will, kidnapping young girls and boys for their sexual pleasure, robbing merchants in the bazaars and fighting and brawling in the streets.57

This environment of rampant insecurity spawned the Taliban, who trace
their origins to a small vigilante group raised by Mullah Omar to free a
young girl seized by militia commanders. While the truth is considerably
more complex, the image of the Taliban as a source of order willing to challenge abusive militias resonates with the experience of many Kandaharis, and
indeed most Pashtuns.
With the U.S. invasion of 2001, however, the Taliban fled and familiar
leaders returned to Kandahar, as they had in the north. The main leaders
from the civil war—the Alokazai under Mullah Naqibullah, and the Barakzai
under Gul Agha Shirzai—resumed their rivalry, even though conditions on
the ground were altered by the presence of foreign troops.
Mullah Naqibullah

During the war against the Soviets, Mullah Naqibullah was a prominent mujahidin commander and leader of the Alokazai tribe. He affiliated with Jamiati-Islami, but remained largely independent of the party’s control. After the
Soviet withdrawal, he was appointed the Rabbani government’s corps commander in Kandahar, which, by some accounts, made him the most powerful
figure in the area.58 However, his Barakzai rival, Gul Agha Shirzai, was appointed governor of the province, thus leading to competition and conflict.
When the Taliban took Kandahar in 1994, Naqibullah promptly surrendered his equipment to them, and many of his 2,500 fighters also joined their
57. Rashid, Taliban, p. 21.
58. Burhanuddin Rabbani was president of a mujahidin government formed after the fall of the
Najibullah in 1992. Although it never effectively ruled the country or even controlled the capital, it
did have some patronage resources and was able to strengthen local allies.
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ranks. Accounts differ about whether Naqibullah himself actually joined the
Taliban, but he spent the next few years quietly in his home village.59 When
the Taliban abandoned Kandahar in 2001 during the U.S. invasion, they
negotiated the surrender of their equipment through Naqibullah, and Karzai
briefly appointed him governor of the province. However, it does not appear
that he reconstituted his forces in any serious way. The Americans were actually suspicious of his relations with the Taliban and thus supported his rival
Gul Agha, who raised a heavily armed force and forced Karzai to make him
governor instead. Naqibullah was offered the position of police chief but
passed it along to his son-in-law, Khan Mohammed.60 Thus, the Barakzais
won the first round in the contest for control of Kandahar.
Gul Agha Shirzai

Gul Agha is a Barakzai Pashtun, the son of the city’s most important mujahidin commander, Abdul Latif. He was also affiliated with the NIFA of Pir
Gailani.61 Gul Agha was appointed governor of Kandahar Province by the
nominal Rabbani government in 1992, but his actual control was limited by
other militias, including the one led by Naqibullah. Lacking exclusive control of the city’s resources, he was strapped for cash and thus permitted his
militias to support themselves through extortion and looting. When the
Taliban attacked Kandahar in 1994, Gul Agha fled to Quetta in Pakistan
before their arrival, effectively ending his operational control over his forces.
He spent the next few years as an import-export merchant in Pakistan.
With the U.S.-led invasion of 2001, Gul Agha quickly rebuilt his forces
with American aid and arrived in Kandahar as the Taliban fled.62 Because
of his military strength and American support, Karzai had little choice but
to appoint him as governor. Unlike in the north, there was a large and
59. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 28–29; Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Military Force,” in
William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New York
University Press, 1998), p. 48. The Taliban may have tried to assassinate him anyway, because his
influence among the Alokazai made him a potential rival. See Jon Lee Anderson, “After the Revolution,” New Yorker, January 28, 2002.
60. Naqibullah claimed he did not want the position because of age and ill-health. Anderson
noted in 2002 that he had been prescribed anti-psychotic drugs. See Anderson, “After the Revolution.”
61. Abdul Latif was assassinated during the Soviet withdrawal under circumstances that remain
unclear. See “Hajji Abdul Latif,” Times (London), August 11, 1989.
62. Fighting between his forces and the retreating Taliban was desultory at best, with some
sources claiming that no shots were exchanged. See Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue (New
York: Penguin, 2006).
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continuous foreign troop presence in Kandahar after the Taliban were
ousted. Gul Agha’s position always depended on foreign sponsorship. Furthermore, the appointment of the Alokazai, Khan Mohammed, as police
chief gave the central government a counterweight to Gul Agha. Gul Agha’s
base of local support was always weak and contested, and his corrupt and
rapacious behavior cost him popular support. He was seen locally as an
emblem of the insecurity associated with the civil war, unlike figures such
as Ismail Khan and Dostum in the north, who represented relative security
and stability for the population in their base areas. As a result, the central
government’s removal of Gul Agha as governor of Kandahar in 2004 was
accomplished with little of the complex maneuvering needed to remove
the Northern Alliance warlords in the north.63
Kandahar under Central Government Control

The Popolzai tribe, meanwhile, has enjoyed a strong position in Kandahar
because its local representatives can draw upon the support of the Popolzai
president, Hamid Karzai. Locally, the Karzais are represented by Hamid Karzai’s brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai. Although they have no real militia, which
weakened their position initially, they do have the patronage resources of the
central government to draw on. This strengthens the position of the Popolzai
and, reciprocally, the central government in the area. The Karzais were thus
able to easily remove Gul Agha from Kandahar, who was later appointed
governor of Nangarhar Province. In November 2005, they transferred Khan
Mohammed to Balkh.64 Ahmed Wali Karzai thus ultimately won the contest
for Kandahar by exiling his main rivals to other provinces.
The central government’s ability to appoint, remove, and transfer officials
in Kandahar signifies its political power but that has not translated into
improved administrative capacity. In the rural areas of the south, people have
largely been forced to rely on local dispute resolution mechanisms because
of the lack of policing and of a functional justice system. This has created an
63. Gul Agha maintained some influence in Kandahar and returned as governor briefly in 2005,
but was subsequently appointed governor of Nangarhar. In that position, he is generally credited
with doing a good job, in part—as he himself admits—because he was not from the area and was
therefore less entangled in local feuds. In 2008, he was named Afghanistan’s “Person of the Year” in
a radio station call-in poll because of his success at bringing relative stability to Nangarhar, suppressing the Taliban, and reducing opium production. Michael Rosenberg, “U.S. Courts Former Warlords in Its Bid for Afghan Security,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2009.
64. Agence France-Presse, “Karzai Reshuffles Police after Afghan Protest,” March 16, 2005.
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opening for the Taliban to exploit. In fact, Karzai’s political dominance may
actually be a liability because it severed patrimonial connections that helped
keep the Taliban at bay. The departure of Khan Mohammed and subsequent
death of Mullah Naqibullah in 2007, for instance, incapacitated the Alokazai
militias that had previously kept the Taliban out of the city of Kandahar,
resulting in a large increase in insurgent activity.65
CONCLUSION

The Afghan state fails in many ways, but its failures are complex and multidimensional, varying regionally and over time. These variations have important
implications for counterinsurgency and state-building efforts in the country.
The experience of the north suggests that recent complaints about the Karzai
government’s competence are overstated.66 Politically, Karzai has been extremely savvy, but he is constrained by his political environment, including
long-term structural factors that are difficult to change. Disbanding the Northern Alliance militias depended on the existence of prior structures of governance maintained by the warlords. That experience is not replicable in the
south, with its historically weaker institutions and complex tribal politics.
Karzai’s great talent as a politician is also his greatest weakness as a state
builder. By deploying the same kind of patronage politics in the north that
he uses in the south, he has made great progress in bringing the region under
his control, but at the cost of undermining the institutions nurtured by the
warlords. The warlords had interests in transcending segmented divisions
and longstanding feuds to secure large, prosperous base areas to support their
militias. Karzai conversely has incentives to exploit these divisions in order
to penetrate the north and build networks of political support.67 By aligning
with some groups, the central government has given their rivals reasons to
align with the insurgency.68
65. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, p. 21; Taimoor Shah, “Taliban Fighters Move in
Near Kandahar for First Time since 2001,” New York Times, October 31, 2007.
66. See, for instance, Elaine Sciolino, “In Leaked Cable, Proposal for Dictator in Afghanistan,”
ibid., October 4, 2008.
67. See, for instance, Antonio Giustozzi and Dominique Orsini, “Center-Periphery Relations
in Afghanistan: Badakhshan between Patrimonialism and Institution Building,” Central Asian Survey 28:1 (March 2009).
68. Giustozzi, “The Taliban’s Marches” and Sippi Azerbaijani Moghaddam, “Northern Exposure
for the Taliban,” in Giustozzi, ed., Decoding the New Taliban.
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In this environment, the repeated proposals and pilot programs to rearm
militias to fight the growing insurgency must be treated with caution.69
These militias are generally recruited locally on the advice of local elders,
which can lead to the government and international forces supporting local
groups selected for their loyalty to the Karzai government. The results could
be disastrous if frustrated rivals decided to sign on with the insurgency. This
is a major hazard, for instance, of the Shinwari tribe’s recent decision to cooperate with the Afghan government against the insurgency, which in U.S.
policy circles has been compared to the Anbar Awakening in Iraq.70 Such
militias need to cut across local segments, feuds, tribes, and kin groups, and
their commanders must have incentives to make peace within their zones of
control, much as the major Northern Alliance warlords did previously. Leaders like Dostum and Ismail Khan created stable zones of relatively good
governance not because they were good people but because the context in
which they found themselves demanded it.
In retrospect, the best plan for Afghanistan in 2001 might have been to
create a federal system allowing the warlords to retain influence over their
respective regions, with central government and international oversight to
deter their worst abuses. This would have been much like the setup in the
Kurdish region of Iraq, where this approach has arguably been highly successful in maintaining relative peace and security. Regional leaders in the
north of Afghanistan could have secured their areas against the Taliban, allowing international and Afghan forces to concentrate resources on building
better governance in the south where no equivalent leaders were available
and where the demands of state-building were much greater.
This option, however, was not adopted at the 2001 Bonn Conference,
which determined the shape of the new Afghan government. It is easy to see
why: at the time, the Taliban seemed a spent force, and the great challenge
appeared to be reining in the reinvigorated Northern Alliance warlords. Furthermore, there were concerns about federalism promoting ethnic conflict

69. “Afghan Militia Gears up to Fight the Taliban,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), February 18,
2009; Waidullah Mohammed, “Can Afghanistan’s New ‘Guardians’ Militia Restore Security in the
Provinces?” Terrorism Monitor 7:20 (July 9, 2009); Dexter Filkins, “Afghan Tribe to Fight in Return
for Aid from U.S.,” New York Times, January 28, 2010.
70. The Anbar Awakening was a tribal alliance in Iraq’s Anbar Province that turned against alQaeda in Iraq in 2005. This proved to be a major turning point in the U.S. efforts against the Iraqi
insurgency.
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and making the country more susceptible to Pakistani influence. Only in
hindsight does the idea of federalism seem attractive.
The failure to stem the Taliban insurgency in the south, however, threatens the progress that has been made in the north. The north’s history of
better governance and unique ethnic composition make it more difficult for
the Taliban to penetrate, but not impossible. For example, Taliban activity
recently has increased in the north, including the assassination of government
officials, attacks on police outposts, and the burning of schools—precisely the
tactics employed in the south to make it impossible to govern.71 The removal
of the Northern Alliance warlords may have contributed to this upsurge by
removing significant obstacles to Taliban penetration. It may well turn out
that the warlords were actually better for local governance in their base areas
than the central government is. Stemming the tide of Taliban insurgency in
the north—with its stronger preexisting institutions—should be the first
priority of counterinsurgency and state-building efforts. Only then should
leaders seek to address the roots of the insurgency in the south, where there
are much greater challenges to improving governance and thereby undermining the appeal of the Taliban. The task is daunting, and the limited resources available need to be concentrated where they are likely to have the
greatest effect.

71. Gilles Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), pp. 27–28; International Council on Security and
Development (ICSD), The Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance (London: ICSD, 2008), pp. 7–8.
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